Building GPU TEEs using CPU Secure Enclaves with GEVisor

 February 8, 2024 at 4:07 pm

SoCC'23

System

  • Trust TPM & Secure Boot
  • Security Monitor implemented at VMX-root level, and the model(with implementation) are formally verified.
  • Enforce access control by trapping instrcuctions

Covered Attacks Surfaces

  • DMA buffer
  • MMIO mapping
  • GPU context

Attack vectors targeting these surfaces:

  • Malicious peripherals
  • Concurrent CPU Access (specific to GEVisor)

Question

  • How to ensure the integrity of Hypercalls? (i.e., protect the ring buffer)
  • How to prove active attackers would be detected by GEVisor? (and how to define active attackers?)
  • Why does the formal verification pass for GEVisor with flaws? (or what does pass mean for GEVisor?)