SGX2 Memory Integrity
Documents
- https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/supporting-intel-sgx-on-mulit-socket-platforms.pdf
- https://heartever.github.io/files/scalable_sgx_public.pdf

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Potential Attacks
- Inside-in Aliasing
- Outside-in Aliasing
Possible sources of aliasing
Server’s RAS feature
- Memory Address Range Mirroring
- Memory Predictive Failure Analysis (PFA)
PFA: if a physical memory page is believed to be affected by an underlying hardware fault (e.g., a weak cell or faulty row in a memory chip or DRAM), the affected page can be retired by relocating its content to another physical page, and placing the retired page on a list of physical pages that should not be subsequently allocated by the virtual memory system.
Documents
- https://lenovopress.lenovo.com/lp0778.pdf
- https://www.supermicro.com/manuals/other/Memory_RAS_Configuration_User_Guide.pd
Possible attack from OS?
Via Memory Components (System Software)
- Program critical system hardware devices, e.g., memory controller, DMA engines (doc1, p113) DMA is controlled by the CPU in x86-64 systems
- Program page tables/EPT => inside-in alias (doc1, p113)
Other possible attack
- Firmware <= defend by secure boot/PFR/Intel Hardware Shield (doc.2)
Documents
- https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/332680-001-720907.pdf
- Intel PFR Github
Related Papers
- https://os.itec.kit.edu/downloads/publ_2017_hillenbrand_xeon_decoding.pdf
- PIkit: A New Kernel-Independent Processor-Interconnect Rootkit
- SGX Explained